An
excellent article in the Guardian Weekly of 5-11 May by Jason Burke discussed
different realities and myths about terrorism. I have long had great suspicion
of propaganda surrounding terrorism, and this article was the strongest analysis
of the subject that I have read in a long time.
Start by
trying to define what terrorism is, and that already helps understand how
political the concept is. The Wikipedia entry about definitions rambled on for
several pages, and indeed there is no universally accepted definition of the
term.
Seemingly,
most groups agree that there are four key components. It must involve violence
or its threat in order to promote some ideological change. It can only be
committed by non-state actors or undercover state actors. It must reach beyond
its immediate targets. And it must be both unlawful and morally indefensible.
No wonder
everyone tries to wriggle around a universal definition. Terrorism carries an
emotional charge that suits governments to apply when they choose to,
unhindered by over-tight definitions. The moral part at the end is the
trickiest. Bashar Al Assad labels most opposition to his regime as terrorism,
and it is only the moral part that others could use to question the label. The
same was true of the IRA in the UK during the Troubles, or of the ANC under
apartheid. Truly, as is often quoted, one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom
fighter.
Burke does
not dwell in this debate, but goes to the next level, in which terrorists are
categorised for propaganda or other purposes. He brilliantly debunks two common
oversimplifications – that of the organised group like Al Qaida and its polar
opposite, the lone wolf.
Al Qaida
announced itself to the wider world on the infamous occasion of 9/11. This act
clearly met the components defining terrorism. Further, Al Qaida did to an
extent match its portrayal in the West, since it had a clear leadership and
some organisation structure.
But this
portrayal was nonetheless exaggerated and dangerously misleading. It started
with George W Bush and his advisors, with a clear focus on retribution and US
public opinion. Bush needed something to declare war on, in order to maintain
support and frame his response. Part of this need was legal, since congress had
to give him a mandate to act, and the US needed to bring allies on board and
ideally the UN Security Council. You can’t declare war on an abstract concept
(though politicians often try to, usually with disastrous results, like the war
on drugs). Al Qaida fitted that bill perfectly, and the US still uses a tiny
law drafted in haste after 9/11 to justify most of its military offensive
operations.
Al Qaida
also worked to sell the response to 9/11 to the US public. A ruthless, evil,
organised enemy fit the required model of a Bond villain perfectly. People
would support an outsized response without looking to closely at comfortable
details like the absence of anything connecting Iraq or Saddam Hussein to Al
Qaida. They would be reassured that their own side had values on its side in a
classic good versus evil confrontation, without looking too hard at Abu Ghraib
or Guantanamo or any justified grievances of Moslems. It also gave some sort of
goal – eliminate Al Qaida and all would be right with the world again – look
how Obama exploited the killing of Bin Laden for political ends.
Other
groups were happy to go along with the exaggerations. Allies could keep public
opinion onside too, and regimes like Egypt could apply the magic words Al Qaida
to deflect attention from their own misdeeds while garnering US weaponry. Even
Al Qaida itself liked it, as it offered a romanticised vision to recruit
around.
We are
going around the same loop again now with ISIS, a term offering a new blank
check to the US military and unsavoury others. And watch out for how the
Houthis and Hezbollah are portrayed as rhetoric is pumped up to justify an
assault on Iran in the next few years.
The problem
is that usually these groups are not like Bond villains at all. We hear all the
time of Al Qaida and ISIS franchises, almost as though the groups were like
MacDonalds, with organograms, manuals and contracts. The reality will be much
more messy. There will be lots of networking, some training and advice, and
lots of talk of shared goals, and there will be some cells working together and
have formal links to other cells, but it will fall far short of anything
resembling a franchise.
The risk is
that the military believes its own propaganda. It fights using methods it would
use against a real franchise or a Bond villain, thereby missing lots of less
formal links and using heavy weapons rather than intelligence. It also
perpetuates the myth that the key to success is to take out the core of the
organisation, the flawed logic that if Raqqa and Mosul are retaken militarily,
then ISIS will vanish. Actually, ISIS will already be dispersing into a far
more dispersed way of working, and arguably will be much more dangerous to the
west once this happens.
Burke
spends even more time on the opposite myth, that of the lone wolf. Apparently,
that term was first used to describe white supremacist activists, and even from
the beginning it was something of a misnomer. True, people acted alone, but
they were encouraged to do so by others and some sort of template for action
was in place.
Lone wolf
is now a common description of all sorts of so-called terrorists. It came into
fashion once it was clear that most violent action by Islamists could not
credibly be assigned to Al Qaida. How could state actors find another narrative
that justified lots of deprivation of liberty and still kept up levels of
vigilance but not outright fear?
The lone
wolf fit the bill. The concept diminished the perceived systemic threat while
maintaining the need for vigilance. It portrayed perpetrators as slightly
deranged, so again there need not be any recognition of any legitimate
grievance. It gave the security service a pervasive excuse for failing to stop
action, since everyone can see that an individual truly acting alone might
leave no prior trace to prevent an attack.
But just as
franchise over-describes the typical operation, lone wolf under-describes it.
Burke shows that so-called lone wolves rarely act with accomplices, and often
have shared values and past connections (such as training) with other groups.
One of my
favourite movies is Four Lions, about a loose group of incompetent jihadists in
the UK. They have flawed goals and methods, and are really just bored and often
rather dumb kids. They are far from anything like Al Qaida, though they will
boast of links. But they are far from lone wolves as well. The movie is
hilarious, but also thought provoking about the true nature of so-called
terrorism.
And the key
thought is about how to control the threat. War on a Bond villain is probably
counter-productive. Looking for lone wolves everywhere is probably hopeless. The
only real solution is to try to understand the common grievances and to reduce
them. Sadly, this key point is almost completely ignored in almost all writing
in the western media, and still less in the corridors of power.
Thanks to
Jason Burke for a first class article. Thinking of so-called terrorists as
either Bond villains or lone wolves is a convenient simplification that insults
our intelligence. Worse, it leads to hopelessly inappropriate public policy.
Please can someone get Four Lions released somewhere where US people can see
it? Let’s start in the White House and the Pentagon, and move forwards from
there.