Something uncanny happened when I took the
time this week to look through various obituaries and commentary pieces about
Lee Kuan Yew, the legendary leader of Singapore who died last week.
Quite by chance, I found an intimate
connection to the three blogs I had posted in March. The piece on ignorance
highlighted the downsides of excessive democracy – something Lee felt so
strongly about that he stifled democracy in his own nation. Then came the piece
about Asia’s chance, with of course Singapore being something of a poster
child. The same connection can be made to the blog about ease of doing
business, where Singapore has been long established as number one.
True to form, everyone is trying to dissect
the career of Lee to see if there are more general lessons available. And true
to form, we tend to be rather selective, emphasizing lessons that conform to
our own dominant logic and downplaying those that seem to reject it. This
learning business is hard.
What is hard to deny is the phenomenal
success of Lee and of his country while he was its leader. The graph of GDP per
capita in the Economist was one of the most telling charts I can recall. When
Lee came to prominence, Singapore languished behind Indonesia, China, Malaysia
and pretty well everyone else. Progressively, each of these was overtaken, and
eventually Singapore even overtook the USA to become one of the richest
countries in the entire world by that metric.
Now, GDP is not everything. But Singapore
does pretty well on many other well-being metrics as well, from life expectancy
to education proficiency to alleviation of poverty. True, civil rights are far
from exemplary. But I am pretty sure that most visitors from other planets
would rather accept the living standards of Singapore together with the
restraints to liberty, compared with freer, less affluent alternatives.
I found several policies and factors that
could have influenced the success of Singapore, that might have lessons for
others.
The first is the political system. Lee was
ruthless in stressing meritocracy and in protecting his land from what he saw
were the vagaries of excess democracy. The result came close to dictatorship.
His party has held power continuously for over fifty years. Elections are held,
but the boundaries seem to be rigged and the seat allocation set to favour his
incumbent party. Within the party, he made sure his own voice held sway. He
also harassed dissenters and was highly litigious. The resulting system came
much closer to China than to European models of democracy.
Lee tried to balance this by making sure he
received sound advice. He started many dialogues with the populace, carefully
controlled, when an issue called for it. He looked outside his own country for
the very best ideas. And most important, he made sure he had the world’s best
and least corrupt civil service, ensured by ruthless suppression of corruption
and by paying public servants very well.
It will be interesting to see how this
system performs now Lee is dead. His son is now in power – always a warning
sign – and the leadership is hardly diverse ethnically, so suggestions of
cronyism ring true. Even in business, great leaders seldom pay sufficient
attention to succession planning.
Of course, Lee’s system is critically
dependent on the top leader. When the leader is respected, somewhat humble and
benign, success can follow. Having a powerful leader allows a strategy to be
defined and followed over many years, not blown off course by the latest fad or
statistic, and enabling the tougher actions to be followed through with less
compromise than in a more democratic system.
The downside is obvious too. What if the
strategy is wrong? What if the leader has quirky ideas that alienate? What if
the leader becomes hubristic or greedy or nepotistic? What happens when the
leader grows old or dies?
Lee epitomizes both the positive and risky
aspects. Most would say the benefits have outweighed the disadvantages, and
Singapore has been lucky to have had him as their leader. But that doesn’t mean
every country should adopt such a system. Lee’s quirks were also plentiful. His
obsession with tidiness lead to draconian laws, famously including one about
disposal of chewing gum. He appeared homophobic, and often seemed to favour
policies close to eugenics.
It is often written that Singapore has no
natural resources. I beg to disagree. The strategic location and the port are
fantastic natural resources that Lee exploited to the full. Logistics advantage
can be as powerful a resource as any other.
His demographic policy was fascinating,
exploiting the small scale of his country and its proximity to ambitious,
mobile people. The border was open, and he made Singapore attractive to people
of ambition and merit. He tried to make this policy blind to race and privilege
and religion, and to a great extent succeeded. Key to this was his housing
policy, which ensured inter-mingling of races and affordability for new
arrivals. He also made sure the housing stock and other infrastructure kept pace
with the growth of population.
Linked to this was a policy to make
Singapore attractive to the sort of arrivals he wanted, and attractive not just
as a fly-by-night short-term destination but a place to put down roots. A lucky
legacy for this were his divorces from first Britain and then Malaysia, which
created a loyalty and patriotism that other city states don’t enjoy. He
maintained this by continuing with strong armed forces and conscription. You
had to buy into Singapore as more than just a place to make lots of money.
So what lessons can be drawn more widely
from the phenomenon of Lee Kuan Yew, either for countries or corporations or
even individuals?
First, long-term strategy is better than
short-term fixing. There are many available good strategies, not all work in
all circumstances, but strategy requires intelligence, and usually builds on
core strengths.
A consequence is that strategy itself has
become an undervalued discipline in corporations, often outsourced to greedy
consultants. Further, core strengths are critical, in Singapore’s case the port
and the nimble scale. Amazon is an example of a company with a consistent
strategy built on core strengths. Rwanda is an example of a country with the
same. A further consequence could be that some combination of Asian and Western
corporate governance models is best.
Next, execution of long-term strategy
requires strong leadership with a mandate. Usually that involves a gifted
single leader with a long time horizon.
A consequence is that too much democracy
can undermine progress. A dilemma is how to choose such a strong leader – in
most cases there is more chance than any selection process involved. And a
system with concentrated power but the wrong leader is the worst system of all.
In the corporate world, it is possible to define recruitment criteria,
incentives and checks and balances – in countries sadly not, at least so far.
Wouldn’t it be great if international bodies were so strong as to be able to
monitor country leadership?
Next, even a strong leader is rarely
perfect. Lee has his quirks. Everyone grows old, and most grow greedy or
cynical or nepotistic. Few think adequately of succession. The consequence is
for what checks and balances that exist to focus on those areas rather than
more short-term factors – again possible in a corporation, impossible so far in
a nation.
Next, even a strong leader has to retain
credibility. This must be real not the ephemeral credibility from propaganda
and fear and short-term wealth. It can come from the luck of loyalty from something
like a war, and be supported by policy, in Lee’s case conscription and some
humble dialogue.
Finally, a smart strategy identifies key
levers. In Lee’s case, these included immigration and housing policy and a
well-funded civil service. Actually, those two might be pretty universal, and
most governments under-prioritise them.
Rest in peace, Lee Kuan Yew, all humanity,
and especially those blessed with Singaporean nationality, have a lot to thank
you for and a lot to learn from you.
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