The leading edge is a common term in business, so common that it is often jokingly termed the bleeding edge. Many distributions in life follow a bell curve, concentrated in the middle, and where the left hand group early adopters or the first over the parapet, can be termed the leading edge. This could represent the first customers of a new product, or the first firms trying to monetise a new technology, or the first people able to overcome some barrier.
It is just as well that most distributions naturally follow a normal or bell pattern. An illustrative example is the demand for Covid vaccines. The supply follows a standard bell curve, because some companies are quicker than others in developing a vaccine and some authorities are quicker in making one available. But the demand is not a bell curve at all; instead most people want a jab as soon as possible. The result is a market failure and a mismatch of supply and demand. Luckily, in most situations both supply and demand have features leading to a bell distribution, so both sides have a chance of matching each other, and also of adapting from early adopters.
It is these early adopters that led me to a concept I introduced last week and called the misleading edge. The issue is that early adopters are in no way typical, but special – that is how they become early adopters. And while early adopters offer the opportunity for adaptation and learning, the fact that they are special creates various risks from the wrong lessons being learned.
I believe an illustrative example arises in uses of new technologies. Some bright spark works out that a device like a wristwatch can be produced that offers medical data such as heart rate. The first producer is a computer nerd, so puts little effort into an easy user experience, instead opting for complexity. The first customers, the early adopters, are also nerdy, young fitness fanatics.
The producer looks at these first results and draws conclusions. Yes, there is a market for this product. Fitness fanatics are interested in all sorts of data, and are quite prepared to navigate small screens to secure a plethora of information. As a result, the producer doubles down on this customer segment. They succeed in creating a profitable niche.
What is the problem? It is possible that the producer has spurned a far larger opportunity, and a far more beneficial one for society. Older, less fit people could derive medical information from such a device that might save their life or at least improve its quality. But these people don’t see the marketing. If they see the marketing, they find it confusing. If by luck their child spots the marketing, works out its value for mum, and gives it as a gift, the parent still does not use it because the screen is too small to read and the user manual is full of technical claptrap. The producer does not see the potential, or gives up too soon, and fails to make the adaptations to unlock the true potential of the innovation. The early adopters have given misleading signals that have placed the technology or a sub-optimal trajectory.
I believe this is one reason why many new technologies remain niche for longer than they should. I also believe that a corporate culture that refuses to fall into the misleading edge trap is one reason behind the success of Apple.
The misleading edge applies just as much in situations that have nothing to do with products. An important example concerns diversity and inclusion, and the speed with which a minority enters an arena they had previously been excluded from.
Last week I argued that the women that first became successful in many fields often had special characteristics. That is just what one would expect; the problem is that this misleading edge of early adapters caused the wrong lessons to be drawn, damaging the wider diversity project.
I identified three archetypes of early successes. The first group are phenomena, women of such exceptional talents that they could knock down any barrier. Then there are impersonators, women who happen to have a set of skills more common in men, and thereafter equipped to succeed in a game still biased by rules set by men. The third group are kittens, women picked by men for reasons that suit men, including pliability or flattery or lack of threat.
The phenomena are fantastic examples but flawed role models, because few can emulate their talents. The myth of the American dream is perpetuated because a few phenomena demonstrate what is possible: it is just highly unlikely. By the same token, men can sustain a set of biased rules by pointing out that it is plainly possible to succeed; they can also delude themselves that the rules are not biased. Finally, the phenomena can make the men feel inadequate, and cause them to delay any relaxation of those rules.
The impersonators are also poor role models, because they might lead others to try to emulate their methods in order to succeed, directly contrary to the goal of broadening the diversity of skills and behaviours. Through no fault of their own, impersonators can prolong an exclusive culture. This cohort is also rather open to derision and unconscious bullying.
The kittens have an even more insidious success. They are often over-promoted and struggle, at the expense of their own mental health. They allow the exclusive group to maintain domination, while convincing themselves and others that the culture has changed, and also perpetuate the myth that women are somehow unsuitable or inferior.
The correct response to those at a leading edge is to welcome them and support them but avoid taking unhelpful lessons from them. This may take patience, and may also involve challenging advice offered by those from the leading edge and their advocates. Even if a quota is reached quickly, that does not imply success or a reason to slow down diversity efforts. Success is only assured once the profiles of successful women are themselves as diverse as those of their male colleagues.
The pitfalls of the misleading edge apply equally to other aspects of human diversity. The early ethnically different leaders often have a colonial type background, making them impersonators. Early LBGT leaders could be either impersonators or kittens, so much so that for a time the typical profile of a gay man among straight society was far from representative. We can celebrate these successes, but must double down until a wider sample break through the barriers. Many of these journeys remain far from complete.
Many companies in the developed world have reached a stage where they believe they have achieved true diversity. They would do well to look beyond the quotas and to look beyond the examples offered by the misleading edge. Until they do, they are more likely to emulate Fitbit (market capitalisation $1.7Bn) than Apple ($2.3 Trn).
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