Britain's Obsession with Decline

A long article in the Guardian Weekly a couple of weeks ago tried to choreograph what would happen when Queen Elizabeth finally dies. She has just passed 91, and that gives her a life expectancy of four years, so it will happen sooner or later.

The article was quite a triumph for research. The monarch hasn’t died since 1952, and the author looked up what happened then and made many comparisons. He or she also interviewed many of the people who would be involved – the event has a code name of London Bridge. Not surprisingly many were reluctant to talk about such a sensitive or even morbid subject, and most of those that did chose to stay off the record.

Despite these challenges, a convincing timetable was drawn up to cover the days immediately following the mobilisation of London Bridge. There will be hundreds of notifications and events, all closely coordinated and with communication to the public a key concern. The Queen has many titles, spanning the globe, and transitions will be required for each of them.

I read once that George VI (or maybe George V) was denied a fully natural death by the pressure of such a timetable. It was deemed important that the death be announced within a certain time window, and, in order to achieve that, the death itself had to be either delayed or brought forward from when it would have occurred naturally. Oh, what it is to be a monarch, you can’t even choose when you die!

One of the more interesting revelations (at least to me) was that one part of the process will be to give Camilla the formal title of queen. In the years immediately following the death of princess Diana that would have been a very controversial step, but apparently there is no way to finesse this in royal protocol. The establishment must be hoping this does not create a major backlash when the time comes.

The article attracted a couple of letters published in the following edition of the Weekly. One of these found the article distasteful, in that poring over a demise of anyone is disrespectful to that person, queen or otherwise. The other letter took a republican line, pointing out how anachronistic the royal family sits in a modern society, and arguing that the demise of Elizabeth would be great moment to get rid of it for good.

I have some sympathy for both points, although I don’t see the monarchy doing all that much damage these days and it does have the advantage of attracting tourists and their wallets. I had a different problem with the article, which was about how it used the historical comparisons to position Britain in decline.

This is a very British attitude to take, and it crops up everywhere in British life. Only 100 years ago, the British were the most powerful and influential nation on earth, presiding over a global empire and fantastic wealth. The reign of Elizabeth has seen the decisive phase of the unravelling of that position. This history is one reason the British tend to favour dark humour and self-deprecation, though the latter is often misinterpreted.

The ceremony over a monarchical change was a perfect backdrop for such an attitude. When George VI died, the earth shook. Britain had relations with countries all over the world, and military presence in most of them. The death was headline news almost everywhere, seen with front-page significance rather than as a catchy news feature. Domestically, the national anthem was sung everywhere and people truly felt as subjects.

All this has indeed declined. But was any of it healthy in the first place? And are these in any way valid measures of a country, beyond the rankings of things like military power?

I see development in Britain between 1952 and today in a very different way. In 1952, most people lived in a cramped two-up, two-down terrace, often with an outside toilet and coal sitting in the bath. Men usually toiled physically until their sixty fifth birthday and died of exhaustion soon afterwards, while women ran massive households despite much of the income drowning at the pub on a Friday night.

The great Beveridge, Butler and Bevan reforms of welfare, education and health were just a few years old, and many were still deprived of their benefits. As the article stated, at the grand conference to declare Elizabeth queen, there was only one other woman present out of 150. Homosexuality was illegal, and giving birth outside wedlock a social death sentence for both mother and child. Most people with a mental health issue were locked away in asylums. Class remained everywhere in society as a barrier to fairness and progress.

Abroad, Britain treated former colonies as sources of minerals, and security issues to be managed without any consideration for development and wellbeing of local populations.

And what of today? Is it really that bad? It is true that Britain has lost some weight in international power games, but arguably the nation has built goodwill and influence in softer ways. As a Brit who has lived abroad for twenty years, I have witnessed how our humour is venerated across Europe and how our brand and culture captivate Americans. An astonishing share of good TV in the US has a British component, while British actors ensnare most of the best roles in movies. British science and higher education remain respected globally.

So I find the whole positioning of Britain in decline simply contradicts the facts. And the important part is that this matters, because it influences how people think and behave. It does little damage to venerate the past glories of the monarchy and to mourn their loss, but when that attitude pervades society it does harm.

The whole European debacle stems from a misplaced attitude among Brits about our role in the world. If we believe that we have lost heft, somehow been outmanoeuvred, and that things continue to decline, it is no wonder that we become cynical of international institutions. If offers an open goal for nationalists and populists, one that they succeeded in converting during the Brexit referendum. Apart from its own follies, Brexit has put essentially stopped other government for many years, and it may also lead to the break up of the union itself, something that would cost more time and create more decline.

So the irony is rich. In painting a false picture of decline, people create an attitude that sows real decline. I am convinced that this is not the intention of the liberal Guardian Weekly, so it should take care that its journalism offers something more balanced and that reflects reality more closely.          

A game-changing idea for society

Every so often we can put two or three big trends together into a melting pot and come up with an idea that could enable progress in many areas at once. Here is one – let people be paid for work they traditionally are not paid for.

Four big trends are facing society together. Each constitutes threats and opportunities.

The first trend is the changing nature of work. Before the industrial revolution, nearly all work was within a community, domestic and unpaid. Then the concept arrived that men should work a job, away from home, from about 18 to 65, Monday to Friday, while women looked after the family.

Now this concept is breaking down. Automation means there are not enough of such jobs to go around. Many people do several jobs, some more like gigs, some at home, and with more flexible boundaries concerning retirement. Consequences include unwelcome idleness, feelings of worthlessness, rising inequality, and straining tax and welfare systems. One partial solution gaining credence is a universal basic income. The candidate of the ruling party in the upcoming French presidential election has this on his platform, so the idea is no longer considered marginal. But it is hard to see how it could be affordable.

The second trend is demographic. We are all more healthy and living much longer. This helps to feed the first trend, because people want or need to work longer. But the bigger impact is social. While healthy, these old people need activities. Then as they gradually become less healthy they create an unmet demand for minor forms of care, more like companionship than medical support. Finally, they do need medical care. Consequences are packed and unpleasant nursing homes, strains on relatives pressed into caring, and unsustainable pressure on health care costs.

The third trend is social. The paradigm that men go out to work and women stay at home has broken down. But residual consequences of the former system linger. Women do most housework. Women are paid less for the same work. Young kids become expensive in terms of lost income or caring costs, yet still often receive insufficient early learning. Much of what women used to do remains undervalued and often barely visible. Consequences include lingering gender inequality and disrespect, and unfair disadvantages for kids of poorer and single parents.

The final trend is technological. Much more is possible nowadays as a result. That feeds the other trends, for example through firms like Uber. But technology also offers a chance to revolutionise what we now call welfare. A billion Indians are now registered in a scheme allowing benefits to be paid with far less waste and corruption. Technology could also monitor domestic and community work, making it possible for it to be paid at affordable costs of administration, safely and with minimal abuse.

Now put all these trends together, and consider the simple idea of enabling payment for many of the things we currently do for free. I do some paid work, but I also look after the kids and help maintain the household. My parents are dead but I volunteer at an old folks home and could do more with more incentive and training. Most of us do these things, and could do more. Our communities could benefit from more of such things being done, and done better.

I envisage a series of roles for segmented groups of recipients. The recipient groups would be pre-schoolers, elementary school kids, older children and adults with mental health issues, people with physical disability, people in forms of rehabilitation or deprivation, independent but lonely elderly, less dependent elderly and fully dependent elderly.

The roles would be tiered, starting from companionship, errands, and moving through group activities towards psychological and educational support and reaching medical monitoring or even limited medical intervention. There are also some civic roles providing things like park maintenance. All roles would require (free) some training before application with any recipients beyond immediate family (and recommended even for that group).

Recipients would carry a personal budget depending on need, and roles paid hourly rates starting at minimum wage and growing with responsibility. Administration would be via something like care.com, with local staff monitoring needs, opportunities and abuses. You can self-report roles carried out within your own family, so for example young kids and aged parents living with or near their children would usually have most of their budgets claimed by their own family. But recipients can’t pocket their own budget – if it is unused it is lost.

Many people would object to this plan, and indeed there would be sure to be teething problems and complicated details to work through. I can envisage three main objections, beyond the group that simply things these things are family responsibilities (usually men thinking their wives should stay at home).

Objection would come from teachers and care workers, fearful of losing their jobs and reductions in quality standards. There are legitimate concerns here, even though the goal is to radically expand provided care rather than to replace existing expert provision, and the scheme would offer supervision opportunities to these groups. One way to win over this group is to demonstrate that the scheme would add perceived value to their expertise and contribution to society.

The second objection would be cynics pointing to abuse and corruption. This would surely exist, no matter how smart the technology. But my heart tells me that in the vast majority of cases the opposite effect would happen. Rather than claiming for shoddy work or work not done, most of us would become some fulfilled by helping society that we would develop bonds with those we are serving, and end up offering much more time and love than we would claim for. This would perhaps be the biggest change and greatest transformative benefit from the idea.

The last and toughest objection would be affordability. For those who think that GDP is the only legitimate goal, this scheme would indeed seem unattractive. I would counter mainly by challenging the primacy of the goal, suggesting a happier and healthier society might be more important, and that indeed such a society would be more productive even by the narrow GDP measure.

But I have practical arguments too. A lot of the funding would actually replace parts of existing schemes, such as child, maternity and disability benefits and even pensions. I would also reduce personal tax allowances. The idea is not to eliminate such things, but create a situation where we earn some of the benefit. As an example, we receive less child benefit, but then claim part of the budget allocated to the child by caring for it. Similarly, a pensioner would receive some services directly instead of money to buy services.

The bigger benefits would come through reductions in budgets for healthcare and other budgets such as prison rehabilitation. More people could live functional lives within their community because of the scheme, reducing needs for things like hospital stays.

No doubt these mitigations would not provide all the funding, though the remainder would be no more than the cost of a universal basic income, for example. The difference I would make up through income taxes on high earners and the old staples of financial transaction and carbon taxes. The net effect would be to redistribute towards those that need it most, and a massive increase in provision of services that society needs.

Of course there is little prospect of anything resembling this idea coming to fruition, certainly not in the so-called land of the free. Watch the Nordics as usual for the first movers. But if you look at the objectors listed above, those are the ones with the power. Taking on chauvinists, protected public sector workers, cynics and corporate apologists all at the same time would be a big challenge. But look at the four trends and what this scheme could achieve, and maybe something like this could gain some momentum. I hope so.

Putinology

I have very low trust in most articles I read about Russia, or indeed other nations that the west paints as adversaries. Whether conspiracy or cock-up, CIA/MI5 inspired or by deluded former military men, such articles often seem to me to insult my intelligence.

Nations and their leaders are routinely portrayed as mortal dangers with little or no evidence, and their actions attributed motives that suit a prevailing narrative. Little attempt is made to understand them from their own view of the world.

So when I find an exception I always treasure it. Recently, a Russian émigré contributed a long article for the Guardian Weekly on the subject of Vladimir Putin. The author had clearly studied Putin in some depth, and had acquired views of some balance.

The article centred around seven popular myths in the west about Putin. The myths are contradictory, but together contrive to paint the pantomime villain we are expected to conclude that he is. The article debunks each myth.

Myth one is Putin the arch strategist, the ruthless chess player with a grand plan. The west needs this one to engender fear. But it does not stand up to scrutiny. Whereas Putin is indeed ruthless, his strategy is constantly changing. He is more of a reactive tactician, spotting an opportunity and striking quickly rather than a consistent, patient operator. Steps in Ukraine betray any sort of strategy, as they did in Georgia beforehand and Syria now. It is all more opportunistic than anything else.

Myth two is Putin as nothing, a victim of events not worthy of our consideration. This one helps the west in ensuring contempt rather than sympathy for a weak enemy. Those peddling this myth like to quote the disastrous Russian economy.

Myth three is somewhat linked; it is Putin the stroke victim. Putin is a short man, and apparently one side of his body seems more flexible than the other, perhaps because of a rumoured stroke many years ago. The west needs this myth to equate Putin to a bond villain, flawed and resentful. It seems to have little foundation, given his much publicised bareback stunts.

Myth four is of Putin the KGB man. This one is nearer the mark; the KGB is his background and he led its successor, the FSB, while many of his entourage have followed the same career path. The west likes this myth because it conjures up secret plots and evil tactics. In truth Putin treats the FSB as a weapon but also a threat and is wary about who to trust and cautious in operations. But he certainly values information, uses information as power, and is ruthless in its collection.

Myth five is Putin the killer. Again, this myth seems to have a kernel of truth, because the deaths of many opponents have been linked back to his office. What is a myth is the part the west uses, that somehow he likes to kill, no doubt while stroking his cat. He is too cautious for that moniker to be credible. What he does have is Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya. Putin’s first serious domestic task was to quell the uprising in Chechnya, and he found a use for the thuggish Kadyrov in that. Since then Putin has managed a tricky relationship with Kadyrov, allegedly using him and his mafia when dirty work needed to be done.

Myth six is Putin the kleptocrat, again useful in the west to paint him as an enemy of his own people and perhaps also as a threat to our own wealth. Putin has indeed enriched himself and his cronies and has a fabulous mansion by the Black Sea. But it appears that amassing wealth is not his primary aim. More he needs control of assets to manage other people.

The last myth is a sort of joke, that Putin shares the name Vladimir Ilyich with Lenin, and thus presumably is an arch communist. The reality is that he doesn’t share the middle name and the first name is one of the most common in Russia. The author uses this myth to demonstrate that in the west we have a habit of projecting virtually any image of Putin that happens to suit us at the time.

So what should we think of Putin, and what lessons can we learn from him? Firstly, despite many of the rumours containing a kernel of unflattering truth, he has been an undoubted roaring success as a leader of his country, if you measure success electorally and by popular opinion – he rarely slips below 80% approval ratings in polls. How has this happened?

Well he had some advantages, mainly what he inherited. Russia in the 1990’s was a scene of chaos, partly thanks to policies imposed by the west. Russian communism was not sustainable (or communism, really) but did have the benefit, before its collapse, of giving everyone a job, good education, housing and some healthcare. No such benefits were retained in the 1990’s, as institutions collapsed and a parody of market economics led to a tiny few seizing all the valuable assets.

Most Russians remember this, and credit Putin for restoring and maintaining order. His government quelled the Chechnya insurgency, started restoring some necessities, and also took a less humiliating stance towards foreign powers. Essentially that recipe remains unchanged today.

Then, weapons from all the myths have helped him stay in power. He has picked a few fights with the US to make his citizens feel like victims, and he has worked tirelessly to stifle the press and political opposition. Economic policies have been populist, constrained by keeping sweet those who could ally to topple him. It has not been edifying or strategic, but certainly a significant achievement.

A few articles have tried to understand Russia as seen by Russians and Putin. It is a proud nation, believing its vast geography and history confers a right to global influence, and the people are stoic and used to hardship. The vast geography makes it tough to control but also easier to divide and rule. The 1990’s were a humiliation and the west is blamed. The mindset is usually of defending the state, with a ring of countries surrounding it – hence the attitude to Ukraine and Georgia, and even Syria, where an air base on the Mediterranean has strategic significance.

But with Putin, as much as anything it is personal. I read the 35 pages of leaked intelligence at the start of the year about the hacking and the Trump campaign. Apart from confirming all the myths as myths, what stood out for me was Putin’s personal pride. He didn’t want Trump to win for strategic interests or to have some hold on the new president; it was mainly because he hated Hillary – she had touched a nerve with him previously.

I have worked in Russia and witnessed a dismal place, utterly riddled with corruption and devoid of trust. The leadership, over generations, indeed over centuries, has been the root cause of this, and I would never be an apologist for what they stood for. I am lucky I was not born there and pity the people who were.

But how can this state of affairs be changed? It will be slowly, for sure, and not by imposing extreme alternatives, nor by demonising the leader as a pantomime villain via myths and fear mongering. It must also involve empathising with Russians and their leaders as they see their world – especially important as tensions ratchet up.

And there is another lesson Putin and Russia can teach us. His methods can work, for a surprisingly long time, retaining massive popularity despite all the hardships they perpetuate. Now, where else has a populist recently been elected, one for whom many of the same myths might be surmised, and one determined to incite enemies so his people feel threatened victims, while trying to muzzle the press and other institutions? We tend to think this will be just for four years – but Putin has made it work for nearly twenty, and is still supreme.