Putinology

I have very low trust in most articles I read about Russia, or indeed other nations that the west paints as adversaries. Whether conspiracy or cock-up, CIA/MI5 inspired or by deluded former military men, such articles often seem to me to insult my intelligence.

Nations and their leaders are routinely portrayed as mortal dangers with little or no evidence, and their actions attributed motives that suit a prevailing narrative. Little attempt is made to understand them from their own view of the world.

So when I find an exception I always treasure it. Recently, a Russian émigré contributed a long article for the Guardian Weekly on the subject of Vladimir Putin. The author had clearly studied Putin in some depth, and had acquired views of some balance.

The article centred around seven popular myths in the west about Putin. The myths are contradictory, but together contrive to paint the pantomime villain we are expected to conclude that he is. The article debunks each myth.

Myth one is Putin the arch strategist, the ruthless chess player with a grand plan. The west needs this one to engender fear. But it does not stand up to scrutiny. Whereas Putin is indeed ruthless, his strategy is constantly changing. He is more of a reactive tactician, spotting an opportunity and striking quickly rather than a consistent, patient operator. Steps in Ukraine betray any sort of strategy, as they did in Georgia beforehand and Syria now. It is all more opportunistic than anything else.

Myth two is Putin as nothing, a victim of events not worthy of our consideration. This one helps the west in ensuring contempt rather than sympathy for a weak enemy. Those peddling this myth like to quote the disastrous Russian economy.

Myth three is somewhat linked; it is Putin the stroke victim. Putin is a short man, and apparently one side of his body seems more flexible than the other, perhaps because of a rumoured stroke many years ago. The west needs this myth to equate Putin to a bond villain, flawed and resentful. It seems to have little foundation, given his much publicised bareback stunts.

Myth four is of Putin the KGB man. This one is nearer the mark; the KGB is his background and he led its successor, the FSB, while many of his entourage have followed the same career path. The west likes this myth because it conjures up secret plots and evil tactics. In truth Putin treats the FSB as a weapon but also a threat and is wary about who to trust and cautious in operations. But he certainly values information, uses information as power, and is ruthless in its collection.

Myth five is Putin the killer. Again, this myth seems to have a kernel of truth, because the deaths of many opponents have been linked back to his office. What is a myth is the part the west uses, that somehow he likes to kill, no doubt while stroking his cat. He is too cautious for that moniker to be credible. What he does have is Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Chechnya. Putin’s first serious domestic task was to quell the uprising in Chechnya, and he found a use for the thuggish Kadyrov in that. Since then Putin has managed a tricky relationship with Kadyrov, allegedly using him and his mafia when dirty work needed to be done.

Myth six is Putin the kleptocrat, again useful in the west to paint him as an enemy of his own people and perhaps also as a threat to our own wealth. Putin has indeed enriched himself and his cronies and has a fabulous mansion by the Black Sea. But it appears that amassing wealth is not his primary aim. More he needs control of assets to manage other people.

The last myth is a sort of joke, that Putin shares the name Vladimir Ilyich with Lenin, and thus presumably is an arch communist. The reality is that he doesn’t share the middle name and the first name is one of the most common in Russia. The author uses this myth to demonstrate that in the west we have a habit of projecting virtually any image of Putin that happens to suit us at the time.

So what should we think of Putin, and what lessons can we learn from him? Firstly, despite many of the rumours containing a kernel of unflattering truth, he has been an undoubted roaring success as a leader of his country, if you measure success electorally and by popular opinion – he rarely slips below 80% approval ratings in polls. How has this happened?

Well he had some advantages, mainly what he inherited. Russia in the 1990’s was a scene of chaos, partly thanks to policies imposed by the west. Russian communism was not sustainable (or communism, really) but did have the benefit, before its collapse, of giving everyone a job, good education, housing and some healthcare. No such benefits were retained in the 1990’s, as institutions collapsed and a parody of market economics led to a tiny few seizing all the valuable assets.

Most Russians remember this, and credit Putin for restoring and maintaining order. His government quelled the Chechnya insurgency, started restoring some necessities, and also took a less humiliating stance towards foreign powers. Essentially that recipe remains unchanged today.

Then, weapons from all the myths have helped him stay in power. He has picked a few fights with the US to make his citizens feel like victims, and he has worked tirelessly to stifle the press and political opposition. Economic policies have been populist, constrained by keeping sweet those who could ally to topple him. It has not been edifying or strategic, but certainly a significant achievement.

A few articles have tried to understand Russia as seen by Russians and Putin. It is a proud nation, believing its vast geography and history confers a right to global influence, and the people are stoic and used to hardship. The vast geography makes it tough to control but also easier to divide and rule. The 1990’s were a humiliation and the west is blamed. The mindset is usually of defending the state, with a ring of countries surrounding it – hence the attitude to Ukraine and Georgia, and even Syria, where an air base on the Mediterranean has strategic significance.

But with Putin, as much as anything it is personal. I read the 35 pages of leaked intelligence at the start of the year about the hacking and the Trump campaign. Apart from confirming all the myths as myths, what stood out for me was Putin’s personal pride. He didn’t want Trump to win for strategic interests or to have some hold on the new president; it was mainly because he hated Hillary – she had touched a nerve with him previously.

I have worked in Russia and witnessed a dismal place, utterly riddled with corruption and devoid of trust. The leadership, over generations, indeed over centuries, has been the root cause of this, and I would never be an apologist for what they stood for. I am lucky I was not born there and pity the people who were.

But how can this state of affairs be changed? It will be slowly, for sure, and not by imposing extreme alternatives, nor by demonising the leader as a pantomime villain via myths and fear mongering. It must also involve empathising with Russians and their leaders as they see their world – especially important as tensions ratchet up.

And there is another lesson Putin and Russia can teach us. His methods can work, for a surprisingly long time, retaining massive popularity despite all the hardships they perpetuate. Now, where else has a populist recently been elected, one for whom many of the same myths might be surmised, and one determined to incite enemies so his people feel threatened victims, while trying to muzzle the press and other institutions? We tend to think this will be just for four years – but Putin has made it work for nearly twenty, and is still supreme.